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JUROR JUDGMENTS ABOUT LIABILITY AND
DAMAGES: SOURCES OF VARIABILITY AND
WAYS TO INCREASE CONSISTENCY
Shari Seidman Diamond, Michael J. Saks, & Stephan Landsman*
What are the principal influences on the verdict that a jury reaches
in a civil case? What affects the size of the jury's damage award?
Theories and speculations about the determinants of liability and
damage verdicts abound' and the strategies and tactics of trial attor-
neys (with or without the assistance of jury consultants) depend on
beliefs about what influences jury decisions. While the published em-
pirical literature provides some limited information on the predictors
of liability judgments (e.g., there is evidence that jurors expect corpo-
rate defendants to be able to prevent injury better than individuals
can and are therefore more likely to hold a corporation liable when all
else is held equal2), there is little evidence that winning a liability ver-
dict or obtaining a big damage award predictably results from select-
ing a jury with particular characteristics. Research on decision-
making about damages indicates that the strongest predictors of jury
damage awards are characteristics of the case rather than attributes of
the jurors. The more severe the injury, the higher the award tends to
be, a pattern consistent with the legal doctrine governing the award of
* Shari Seidman Diamond, American Bar Foundation and University of Illinois at Chicago;
Michael J. Saks, University of Iowa; Stephan Landsman, DePaul University. The authors wish
to express their appreciation to G.D. Searle and Co., and, in particular, to its General Counsel,
Robert Bogomolny, for a grant to the authors which supported the research underlying this work
and without which the research could not have been accomplished. The views expressed herein
are exclusively those of the authors. No restrictions of any sort were imposed on the authors'
research or analysis by those who provided financial support for the project. Additional support
for analysis came from the American Bar Foundation. Thanks are also due to Jason Schklar at
the American Bar Foundation for outstanding research assistance.
1. For reviews of this literature, see STEPHEN DANIELS & JOANNE MARTIN, CIVIL JURIES AND
THE POLITICS OF REFORM (1995); Michael J. Saks, Do We Really Know Anything About the
Behavior of the Tort Litigation System-And Why Not?, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 1147 (1992); and
Neil Vidmar, Pap and Circumstance: What Jury Verdict Statistics Can Tell Us About Jury Behav-
ior and the Tort System, 28 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 1205 (1994).
2. Valerie P. Hans & M. David Ermann, Responses to Corporate versus Individual Wrongdo-
ing, 13 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 151 (1989); Robert J. MacCoun, Differential Treatment of Corpo-
rate Defendants by Juries: An Examination of the "Deep-Pockets" Hypothesis, 30 L. & Soc'y
REV. 121 (1996).
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compensatory damages. 3 Acknowledging the importance of the case,
however, does not end all appropriate inquiry. There remains consid-
erable uncertainty about the extent to which error and bias affect ju-
ror damage awards. Although most scholars agree that damage
awards contain some variation that cannot be explained by legally rel-
evant aspects of the case, there is disagreement about the sources of
that variation and about whether acceptable approaches exist that can
reduce it.4 In this article, we describe the results of a large-scale jury
simulation study that provides evidence about the sources of unex-
plained variation in civil jury verdicts. We then suggest some ways to
reduce undesirable disparity across cases-that is, disparity that arises
when similar cases result in different verdicts on liability or damages.
Some of the unexplained variation in jury awards is due to limita-
tions in the way researchers have been able to measure legally rele-
vant characteristics like seriousness of injury. While archival studies
of jury awards have already revealed that seriousness of injury is an
important predictor of jury awards,5 it may be even more important
than those studies have been able to demonstrate because of the rela-
tively crude measures generally used to reflect seriousness of injury.
Some of the "unexplained" variation in awards across cases which
vary in manifold ways may arise because juries draw appropriate dis-
tinctions not captured in a nine-level unidimensional scale used to
measure seriousness of injury.6 Jurors may be appropriately respon-
sive, although the measure is not, to differences between deafness and
loss of a kidney or between the loss of a dancer's leg and the loss of a
violinist's leg. Archival studies relying on relatively crude variables
can reveal only imperfectly whether jurors are treating similar cases
differently, or whether the purportedly similar cases are actually dif-
ferent and as a result evoke different jury responses. Thus, most ex-
3. See, e.g., MARK A. PETERSON, COMPENSATION FOR INJURIES: CIVIL JURY VERDICTS IN
CooK CourTv (1984); Frank Sloan & Chee Ruey Hsieh, Variability in Medical Malpractice Pay-
ments. Is the Compensation Fair?, 24 L. & Soc'Y REV. 997 (1990); Neil Vidmar et al., Jury
Awards for Medical Malpractice and Post-Verdict Adjustments of Those Awards, 48 DEPAUL L.
REV. 265, 268-69 (1999).
4. See, e.g., David Baldus et al., Improving Judicial Oversight of Jury Damages Assessments: A
Proposal for the Comparative Additur/Remittitur Review of Awards for Nonpecuniary Harms and
Punitive Damages, 80 IOWA L. REV. 1109 (1995); Joseph Sanders & Craig Joyce, Off to the Races:
The 1980s Tort Crisis and the Law Reform Process, 27 Hous. L. REV. 207 (1990); Peter H.
Schuck, Mapping the Debate on Jury Reform, in VERDICT: ASSESSING THE CIVIL JURY SYSTEM
306 (Robert E. Litan ed., 1990).
5. See, e.g., PETERSON, supra note 3; Sloan & Hsieh, supra note 3; Vidmar et al., supra note 3.
6. Michael J. Saks et al., Reducing Variability in Civil Jury Awards, 21 LAW & HUM. BEHAV.
243 (1997).
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isting archival studies are limited in what they can disclose about one
form of horizontal inequity-differential treatment of similar cases.
One way to investigate variation in juror response is to hold con-
stant the characteristics of the plaintiff's injury and other aspects of
the case in a simulation, to present that trial evidence to a large
number of people, and then to carefully scrutinize patterns of varia-
tion in juror verdict preferences. That approach also makes it possible
to examine the potential sources of any variation in response from
different jurors who are confronted with identical evidence relevant to
liability and damages. In an experiment designed principally to evalu-
ate the impact of bifurcation on jury behavior, we began by measuring
a variety of individual differences among jury-eligible citizens. 7 These
study participants then served as mock jurors who watched a video-
taped products liability trial. This procedure allowed us to measure
the variability in verdict preferences in a large sample of jurors re-
sponding to the same trial, and to assess the ability of a variety of
individual difference measures to predict liability verdicts and awards
for specific or economic damages (e.g., lost wages, medical expenses)
and general damages (e.g., for pain, suffering, loss of enjoyment of
life) in a products liability case.
The Trial
We combined and edited the evidence and arguments from tran-
scripts of several asbestos products liability trials to produce "Boyd v.
American Beryllium Corporation." The case involved Thomas Boyd,
a plasterer who complained that he suffered from beryliosis as a result
of his exposure to the airborne residue of a fire-proofing material
("Berylico") that was sprayed on the bare beams of buildings at which
he worked erecting plaster walls. We called the toxic substance beryl-
lium rather than asbestos so that the jurors would not respond based
on what they thought about the highly publicized asbestos cases.
The defendant, American Beryllium Corporation ("ABC"), blamed
Boyd's lung problems primarily on Boyd's smoking history. We asked
several products liability practitioners to review our trial and to tell us
whether it presented a relatively typical products liability case of its
kind. All agreed that it did. Following pilot testing, we hired profes-
sional actors, a director, and a video production company to videotape
and edit several different versions of the case.8 In the weak version of
the case, Berylico was allegedly used at only 10% of Boyd's job sites
7. See Stephan Landsman et al., Be Careful What You Wish For: The Paradoxical Effects of
Bifurcating Claims for Punitive Damages, 1998 Wis. L. REV. 297.
8. See id. for a more detailed description.
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and Boyd, who smoked two packages of cigarettes a day, continued to
smoke at that rate even after he became ill. In a stronger version of
the case, Berylico was allegedly used at 30% of the job sites and Boyd,
who smoked four or five cigarettes a day, had quit at the first sign of
lung problems. Each version of the case was presented in either a
unitary or bifurcated format. In the unitary format, the jurors heard
testimony concerning liability and the alleged damages suffered by
Boyd from ABC's product along with evidence relevant only to the
propriety of awarding punitive damages (i.e., the net worth of ABC
and evidence that ABC had possessed and suppressed early knowl-
edge about the potentially injurious attributes of Berylico). In the bi-
furcated format, the jurors were presented with the trial portion
relevant to punitive damages only if they had first found ABC liable
for compensatory damages and made a compensatory award.
The Participants
The participants in the study were jury-eligible adults from Cook
County, Illinois who were recruited for a mock jury trial. Their partic-
ipation was obtained through telephone solicitation by a telemarket-
ing firm and through advertisements in a local newspaper.
Participants were offered $100 to participate in a day-long session to
be held on a Saturday or Sunday. Any potential recruit who had par-
ticipated in a focus group of any type during the previous twelve
months or who had ever participated in a mock jury trial was ex-
cluded. Recruitment specifications were designed to obtain a mix of
jurors that matched the distribution in the Cook County jury pool.9
See infra Appendix for breakdowns by gender, age, race, and educa-
tion. The distribution on these variables is nearly identical to that ob-
tained from the Cook County jury pool, with the exception of
education level. Cook County jurors are somewhat less likely to have
had some college experience (69%) than the participants in our study
(76%). This modest difference arose because not all of those who
agreed to participate actually kept their appointments and the loss va-
ried slightly with education level.
Procedures
A total of 1,042 respondents participated in the study in one of
twenty-six one-day weekend sessions. Before viewing a videotape of
9. These figures were obtained from jury research conducted in Cook County. See Shari Seid-
man Diamond & Jonathan D. Casper, Blindfolding the Jury to Verdict Consequences: Damages,
Experts, and the Civil Jury, 26 L. & Soc'y REV. 513, 529 n.15 (1992).
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the trial (lasting approximately two and one-half hours), each juror
filled out a questionnaire providing the kind of information that jurors
might be asked to provide during jury selection in a case of this type.
After viewing the tape, each juror indicated how he or she would have
decided the case. The jurors were then randomly divided into deliber-
ators and non-deliberators. The 720 deliberators were randomly allo-
cated to 120 six-person juries. Each jury deliberated and then reached
a verdict. All jurors filled out an elaborate post-tape questionnaire,
the 720 deliberators following their deliberations, and the 322 non-
deliberators directly after they completed their verdict forms. 10
The Measures
We questioned the jurors on the pre-tape questionnaire about a
standard set of ten background characteristics: age, gender, ethnic/ra-
cial background, family income, education, political leaning, prior ex-
perience as a juror, litigant, or witness, and past and current smoking
behavior (the plaintiff's smoking history was a potential competing ex-
planation for his injury). We also asked questions about their atti-
tudes on nine issues relevant to litigation in general or to the case they
were about to hear in particular. These questions assessed impres-
sions about civil lawsuits (e.g., whether there is too much litigation),
opinions about big business and expert witnesses, and attitudes to-
ward smokers with health problems." Finally, to obtain a measure of
any internal guideposts a juror might use to evaluate financial infor-
mation, we asked how much a person has to earn to be considered
wealthy. We also asked jurors to indicate the minimum and maximum
amounts they thought would be required to compensate the victim of
a car accident for various injuries and we used these estimates to cre-
ate an index of perceived loss associated with personal injury. See
infra Appendix for the measures based on the pretape questionnaire.
Predicting Liability Decisions
After viewing the trial, 51% of the jurors favored a verdict for the
plaintiff. We designed the study so that liability would be ambiguous,
in part to allow us to examine sources of variation in liability verdicts.
10. The research design was slightly more complicated for jurors assigned to the bifurcated
format than to the unitary format. They reached individual decisions on compensatory liability
and damages and, if they found the defendant liable, then viewed the tape involving the evidence
relevant only to punitive damages.
11. Some of these measures were formed based on a factor analysis of items. Thus, the value
for INTERFERE (see Appendix, at 324) is the mean of four items. The value for PUBLIC
SAFETY (see Appendix, at 324) is the mean of two items.
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Most previously published research, primarily on criminal cases,
suggests that background characteristics are relatively poor predictors
of juror verdict preferences. 12 In the present case we found that five
of the ten background characteristics were significantly related to the
juror's liability verdict preference.
Although some of the relationships are weak, they emerge as statis-
tically significant because the sample size (1,021) is substantial. 13 See
Table I for correlations between all of the individual difference meas-
ures and juror verdict preferences. Minority jurors were more likely
to find liability than were non-minority jurors (63% liable versus 46%
liable). Less educated and lower income jurors were more likely to
find for the plaintiff than college graduates and higher income jurors
(59% for high school or less and 56% for some college versus 42% forcollege graduates). Women were more likely to find the defendant
liable than were men (55% versus 47%). Finally, jurors who were
current or recent smokers were somewhat more likely to find for the
plaintiff than those who had quit years earlier or never smoked (56%
versus 49%). Some of these variables are correlated with one an-
other. For example, race is significantly correlated with both educa-
tion (r=.18, p<.001) and income (r=.16, p<.001). As a result, the
simple comparisons using only one juror characteristic do not unam-
biguously identify the source of the relationship with verdict prefer-
ence. When we use all of these ten background characteristics in the
same equation to predict liability verdicts, however, each of the char-
acteristics that was a significant individual predictor makes an in-
dependent contribution in the composite model except smoking
history.' 4 The amount of variation explained by the composite model
is 5.4%-a significant improvement over what could be predicted by
guessing, but an amount that leaves a substantial 94.6% of the varia-
tion unexplained. 15
Thus, background characteristics show only a modest association
with verdict preferences, a pattern that demonstrates the weakness of
12. See Shari Seidman Diamond, Scientific Jury Selection: What Social Scientists Know and Do
Not Know, 73 JUDICATURE 178 (1990); Steven D. Penrod, Predictors of Jury Decision Making in
Criminal and Civil Cases: A Field Experiment, 3 FORENSIC REP. 261 (1990).
13. We dropped 21 jurors from the analysis because they gave uninterpretable verdicts;
although they did not find the defendant liable, they awarded damages.
14. Educational level, age, race, and income level are all correlated with the index of smoking
history and when they are included as predictors, the modest predictive value of smoking history
becomes non-significant. See infra, Table II, Model I.
15. This pseudo-R2 is the Cox and Snell calculation. Using the less conservative Nagelkerke
pseudo-R2, the variance explained is 7.2%, leaving 92.8% of the variance unexplained. For a
description of both measures, see Nico J.D. Nagelkerke, A Note on a General Definition of the
Coefficient of Determination, 78 BIOMETRIKA 691 (1991).
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TABLE I. CORRELATIONS BETWEEN INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCES AND
JUROR VERDICTS
Liability Total Pain and Economic
(1=plaintiff; Damages Suffering Damages
0=defendant)' (Trimmed) (Trimmed) (Trimmed)
Background
Age
Gender
Race
Politics
Education
Income (logged)
Prior Juror?
Prior Witness?
Prior Party?
Last Smoked
Attitudes
Toward Lawsuits:
Too Much
Legitimacy
Easy to Win
Toward Business/Regulation:
Business
Interfere
Public Safety
Toward Experts:
Expertise
Trustworthiness
Toward Smokers:
Blame
Internal Guideposts
Wealth (trimmed)
Loss (trimmed)
Case Characteristics
Strength
Format
* p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001
.02
-.08*
-. 16"***
-. 04
-. 14'***
-.12**
.02
-. 02
-. 03
-. 07*
.03
.15"***
-. 06
-. 06
-. 03
.04
-. 02
.01
-. 05
.00
-. 01
-. 09*
.04 .05
.04 .05
.00 .02
.11*
.15'*
.09*
-. 02
.07
.17"***
.11*
-. 03
-. 05
-. 10*
-. 03
.06
-. 04
.02
-. 07
-. 01
.01
-. 08
.00
.07
-. 05
.06
-. 01
-. 07
.02
.02
-. 04
.02
.12*
.05
.01
Sample sizes vary slightly for correlations due to pair-wise deletion. In each column Income
(logged) and the Loss index (a composite based on eight responses) produced the greatest
reduction due to missing values:
Liability: N for Income = 951, for Loss = 909, N for all other variables: 996-1021
Total Damages: N for Income = 474, for Loss = 454, N for all other variables: 503-517
Pain and Suffering: N for Income 432, for Loss = 413, N for all other variables: 459-472
Economic Damages: N for Income = 433, for Loss = 414, N for all other variables: 460-474
Note: Ns for total damages exceed Ns for components because a sub-sample of forty-four jurors
who found the defendant liable was asked only to indicate a total damage award.
relying solely on these indicators in exercising peremptory challenges
during jury selection. The failure of these measures as strong
predictors emphasizes the fact that focusing on demographic charac-
teristics neglects the substantial variation in response within catego-
ries, for example, among college-educated jurors or among women.
Moreover, attorneys selecting a jury should be hesitant about using
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TABLE II. LoGISTIc REGRESSION COEFFICIENTS FOR
LIABILITY JUDGMENTS
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
Predictors b b b b b b
Background
Age
Gender
Race
Politics
Education
Income (log)
Prior juror
Prior wit.
Prior party
Last Smoked
Attitudes
Too Much
Legitimacy
Easy to Win
Business
Interfere
Public Safety
Expertise
Trustworthiness
Blame
Internal Guideposts
Wealth (trimmed)
Loss (trimmed)
Case Characteristics
Strength
Format
-2 log
likelihood
Model
Chi-square
*p<.0 5 ; **p<.01
-. 01
-. 31"
-. 44**
-. 09
-. 30**
-. 30*
.17
-. 16
-. 23
-. 04
.28**
-.06
.04
.20**
.08
-.21*
.01
.25**
.12"*
- - .00
- - .00*
.01
-. 09
-. 05
-. 03
-. 32**
-. 32*
.20
.08
-. 26
.02
.21"*
-. 07
.01
.24**
.04
-. 21"*
.04
.30**
.12"
-- .00
-- .00*
- - - .51* .76** .71**
- - - .44** .48** .45**
1232.53 1271.42 1236.44 1388.59 973.84 1029.89
51.14** 122.72** 8.44* 26.29** 158.61** 148.35**
some of these background characteristics for another reason as well:
under Batson v. Kentucky16 and its progeny,17 attorneys are constitu-
tionally prohibited from using race and gender as a basis for exercising
a peremptory challenge. An alternative approach to predicting ver-
dict preferences, and one that also turns out to be more informative,
directs attention to the attitudes and beliefs that jurors bring to the
case rather than to their background characteristics.
16. 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
17. See, e.g., J.E.B. v. Alabama, 511 U.S. 127 (1994) (prohibiting gender-based challenges);
Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614 (1991) (expanding the racial prohibitions of
Batson to attorneys in civil cases).
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We examined nine measures of juror attitudes in the study. Three
measures related to attitudes toward lawsuits in general: (1) whether
plaintiffs generally receive too much or too little in a lawsuit (a varia-
ble we labeled "TOO MUCH"); (2) how legitimate it is to sue (LE-
GITIMACY); and (3) how easy or difficult it is to win a civil lawsuit
(EASY TO WIN). As Table I indicates, all three of these measures
were significantly related to liability preferences. Jurors who see
plaintiffs in a more favorable light generally, who think it is more le-
gitimate to sue, and who think it is more difficult to win a lawsuit were
more likely to hold the defendant liable. In fact, the strongest of all of
the predictors of juror liability verdicts was the first question about
recovery from lawsuits (TOO MUCH): "When plaintiffs sue in a law-
suit and receive money damages, would you say that in general they
receive: (on a scale from 1 to 7) 1=too much through 7=too little?" By
itself this question explained 6.9% of the variance in verdicts 18-more
than all of the background characteristics together. The relative suc-
cess of this variable in predicting juror liability verdicts may reflect the
success of efforts in persuading some members of the public that a
litigation explosion is burdening the civil justice system with suits by
undeserving plaintiffs.19 Without information on how jurors would
have responded to this question before the rhetoric on the litigation
explosion became commonplace in the public discourse, we cannot be
sure: jurors may have always varied in their evaluation of what plain-
tiffs generally receive, and that perception may have always influ-
enced their evaluation of plaintiffs whose claims they were asked to
judge. Nonetheless, it is striking that this single question was the most
powerful predictor we identified.
Three of the attitude measures assessed juror responses to business
and to the legal regulation of business. Since the case presented to
these jurors involved an individual plaintiff suing a corporation for an
alleged product defect, we included these measures to canvass juror
attitudes about the balance between business and the protection of
the public. The three measures assessed: (1) overall attitude toward
business (BUSINESS); (2) the extent to which, regulation and lawsuits
interfere with business (INTERFERE); and (3) the need for regula-
tion to ensure public safety (PUBLIC SAFETY). All three of these
measures were significantly related to liability judgments. Jurors
more favorable to business, those who perceived regulations and law-
18. The corresponding Nagelkerke value is 9.2%. See Nagelkerke, supra note 15, at 691.
19. For a discussion of some of these efforts, see Stephen Daniels, The Questions of Jury
Competence and the Politics of Civil Justice Reform: Symbols, Rhetoric, and Agenda Building,
LAW & CONTEMI'. PROBS., Autumn 1989, at 269.
19981
DEPAUL LAW REVIEW
suits as interfering with business, and those who saw less of a need for
regulation to ensure public safety were less likely to find the defend-
ant liable.
We used two additional measures to assess juror responses to ex-
perts. The case involved important expert testimony from medical ex-
perts for both the plaintiff and the defendant disputing the source of
the plaintiff's health problems.20 We reasoned that greater confidence
in expert testimony in general would be related to liability verdicts
only if one of the physician experts was viewed by jurors as substan-
tially more credible than the opposing expert. The two measures of
attitudes toward experts reflected the two major attributes of credibil-
ity: expertise and trustworthiness.21 The first measure, reflecting per-
ceived expertise (EXPERTISE), was unrelated to liability verdicts,
but the second measure, trustworthiness (TRUST), produced a signifi-
cant correlation: jurors with greater trust in the objectivity of experts
were more likely to favor a verdict for the plaintiff. Jurors in general,
whether they had high or low trust in experts, viewed the plaintiff's
expert physician more favorably in this case than they viewed the de-
fendant's expert.22 This gap in credibility between the two experts ap-
peared to lead jurors more inclined to rely on the testimony of experts
to be more inclined to favor a verdict for the plaintiff in this case.
Finally, since the case involved a plaintiff whose smoking may have
contributed to his injury, we asked about the blameworthiness of
smokers who developed health problems (BLAME). Jurors who felt
smokers had themselves to blame for smoking-related illnesses were
significantly more likely to reach verdicts in favor of the defendant.
What is perhaps surprising is that the juror's attitude toward smoking
and liability captured in this single question was a stronger predictor
20. The plaintiff also presented an expert in economics who testified about lost income based
on the inability of the plaintiff to work.
21. See CARL I. HOVLAND ET AL., COMMUNICATION AND PERSUASION (1953); Michael H.
Birnbaum & Steven E. Stegner, Source Credibility in Social Judgment: Bias, Expertise and the
Judge's Point of View, 37 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 48 (1979); Glenn Hass, Effects of
Source Characteristics on Cognitive Responses and Persuasion, in COGNITIVE RESPONSES IN PER-
SUASION 141 (Richard E. Petty et al. eds., 1981); Elliott McGinnies & Charles D. Ward, Better
Liked Than Right: Trustworthiness and Expertise as Factors in Credibility, 6 PERSONALITY &
Soc. PSYCHOL. BULL. 467 (1980).
22. Jurors rated each expert on how believable, trustworthy, competent, and knowledgeable
they were on 7-point scales (e.g., 1=Believable, 7=Not believable). The plaintiff's expert was
rated as significantly more believable (2.62 v. 4.27), more trustworthy (2.95 v. 4.37), more com-
petent (2.78 v. 4.00), and more knowledgeable (2.60 v. 3.70). Note that 4 is the mid-point on each
scale, so that the average ratings for the plaintiff's expert were positive, while the average ratings
for the defendant's expert were relatively neutral. (These means are based on ratings by the 314
non-deliberators whose ratings were not influenced by deliberating. All differences were signifi-
cant at p<.001.)
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of liability judgments (r=.14, p<.001) than was the juror's smoking his-
tory (r=.07, p<.05).
Thus, eight of the nine attitudes we measured were significantly re-
lated to liability preferences. When we used all of these nine back-
ground characteristics to predict liability verdicts, five of them made
significant independent contributions in the composite model: one of
the three measures of general attitude toward litigation (TOO
MUCH), two of the three measures of attitudes toward regulating
business (INTERFERE and PUBLIC SAFETY), the measure of ex-
pert trustworthiness (TRUST), and the measure of attitude toward
smokers (BLAME). The amount of variation explained by the com-
posite model is 11.5%, twice the variance accounted for by the model
that included only background characteristics, 3 but far from a com-
plete model accounting for variations in juror response (see Model 2
in Table II).
The remaining individual differences we measured were internal
standards that we anticipated might supply a context for juror judg-
ments on award sizes. We did not predict that they would be related
to liability judgments (see Model 3 in Table II). The first was how
much a person would have to earn to be considered wealthy
(WEALTH) and, as expected, it was not related to liability verdict
preference. The second was a composite index of damage amounts
that the juror thought would be appropriate to compensate a person
injured in a car accident who suffered one of four possible injuries
(LOSS). Despite our expectations, we found that LOSS was signifi-
cantly related to the likelihood of a plaintiff's verdict: jurors with
higher LOSS values were more likely to find the defendant liable.
Although the relationship was not strong, it suggests that some jurors
partially fused the decision on liability with the one on damages, al-
lowing a more generous response to injuries in general to increase
their receptivity to liability in this case.24
Each of the eight significant predictors described to this point made
significant independent contributions. Thus, two of the ten back-
ground characteristics, education and income, remained significant
predictors. Five of the nine attitudinal measures, TOO MUCH (the
fairness of what plaintiffs receive), BUSINESS (how favorably busi-
ness is viewed), PUBLIC SAFETY (the need for regulation to ensure
product safety), TRUST (expert trustworthiness), and BLAME
23. The Nagelkerke value was 15.3%, also twice the corresponding value (7.2%) for the
model including only background characteristics. See Nagelkerke, supra note 15, at 691.
24. Edith Greene, On Juries and Damage Awards: The Process of Decisionmaking, LAw &
CONTEMP. PROBS., Autumn 1989, at 225, 233-34.
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(blameworthiness of smokers) also made significant contributions,
along with one of personal financial guideposts, LOSS. Yet when all
eight of these measures were included in the same analysis, they ac-
counted for a total of only 14% of the variation in response by jurors
who were judging similar versions of the same products liability case.
The case was in fact identical for all jurors with two important excep-
tions: jurors in the study had been randomly assigned to one of two
different versions of the case and those who saw the version of the
case in which the evidence for liability was greater were, as expected,
more likely to find the defendant liable (56.5% for the moderate case
and 45.6% for the weaker case). In addition, the case they saw was
presented either in a unitary format which included the punitive dam-
age evidence during the trial on compensatory liability and damages
or in a bifurcated format. Jurors who viewed the trial in the unitary
format were more likely to find for the plaintiff (55.3% versus 42.9%)
(see Model 4 in Table II).
Because the intentional differences in case strength and format ac-
counted for 2.5% of the variation in juror response, it is appropriate
to evaluate the contribution of the other significant predictors in light
of the variance not explained by case strength and format. Thus, we
might estimate the variance accounted for by the eight background,
attitudinal, and internal guidepost measures as 14.2/97.5 = 14.6%. (Us-
ing the Nagelkerke estimate for the pseudo-R2 , the corresponding
value would be 18.9/96.6 = 19.6%.)
As Models 5 and 6 in Table II indicate, 25 the fitted logistic regres-
sion equation including all ten variables would enable us to explain
18% of the variation in damage awards.26 Another way to describe
this pattern is to say that roughly 50% of the verdicts would be accu-
25. Model 5 includes both significant and non-significant predictors; Model 6 includes only the
significant predictors.
26, It is important to note that the ability to obtain predictions of jury verdicts in another case
that would be as accurate as these would depend on: (1) the extent to which these individual
responses effectively predict jury verdicts following group deliberations; (2) the similarity be-
tween the cases (recall that the predictive value of the trust in experts is likely to depend on the
differential credibility of opposing experts); and (3) the reliability of the estimates obtained here
when applied to new samples. To test the latter, we re-ran the logistic regressions using 20
different randomly generated samples of 510 jurors (half the sample) from the full sample of
1,021 jurors. Only the unitary v. bifurcated format of the case produced a stable effect at least at
the p<.10 level in all 20 reliability tests. Five of the ten variables that were significant at p<.05 in
the full sample were significant at p<.05 in at least half of the reliability tests (case format,
education, business, public safety, and trust). Note that one of these variables is a case charac-
teristic, another variable, education, is a background variable, and the three remaining variables
reflect individual differences in attitude. Studies conducted by jury consultants to inform jury
selection are generally based on much smaller samples which are likely to show greater instabil-
ity in estimates.
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rately predicted simply by flipping a coin. By knowing the version and
format of the case they saw, 57% of the jurors' verdict preferences
would be accurately predicted. Finally, knowing and optimally
weighting the information obtained from all of the juror characteris-
tics would enable us to accurately predict 67% of the jurors' verdict
preferences. Thus, although this research indicates some predictabil-
ity of juror verdict preferences in what was an intentionally ambigu-
ous case, the variation in response is largely unexplained by the
individual differences among jurors that we measured. While this re-
sult may be disappointing to attorneys and jury consultants attempting
to identify friendly jurors, it may also reflect a valuable asset of the
jury: the verdict is produced by the pooling of different estimates that
are combined to produce a justifiable answer to a question not suscep-
tible to an unequivocal truth test.
Predicting Damage Awards
Before turning to decisions on damage awards, it is important to
distinguish among the various types of awards. Jurors are provided
with substantially more guidance when they are asked to give awards
for economic rather than for general damages, that is, for lost earnings
and medical expenses as opposed to awards to compensate for pain
and suffering.27 Past medical expenditures involve no predictions,
only an assessment of what has already taken place. An evaluation of
the amount in lost wages requires somewhat more in the way of esti-
mation, particularly when the plaintiff is asking for an award that de-
pends on what his future earnings would have been but for the injury.
Although information on past earnings and expert testimony can pro-
vide some guidance on the path those earnings would have been likely
to take, there is still a substantial need for juror assessment and pre-
diction. Similarly, to estimate future medical expenses, the jurors are
provided with expert testimony assessing the likely future course that
the plaintiff's illness and treatment will take. Despite these chal-
lenges, jurors receive substantial and relevant evidence and advice
during the trial on which to base economic damage estimates. In con-
trast, jurors (and judges) determining awards for pain and suffering
27. In our experimental case, the mock jurors were provided with the following information
regarding damages. The plaintiff's medical expert stated in the course of his testimony that past
medical expenses amounted to $18,500 and that he expected future medical expenditures to run
about $4,000 per year. The plaintiff's economic expert calculated that Boyd had lost approxi-
mately $300,000 in wages due to his medically-induced early retirement from work and that his
future life expectancy based on actuarial tables was approximately 16 years. As is typically the
case, there was no expert testimony provided regarding the appropriate sum to be paid for pain
and suffering.
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are provided with no factual information and precious little guidance
from the law on what is relevant. Usually, the jurors' only guide is the
vague directive that they should arrive at an amount that "a reason-
able person would estimate as fair compensation. '28 As a result, we
might anticipate greater volatility in damage awards for pain and suf-
fering than for economic damages, and that is what we find (see Table
III). Whether the variation in awards is compared by looking at the
standard deviation for raw or trimmed2 9 economic damage awards
versus pain and suffering damage awards, and whether that variation
is expressed in raw numbers or as a percentage of the mean award,
jurors are far more consistent in the level of economic damages they
favor than in the amounts they identify as appropriate to compensate
the plaintiff for pain and suffering.30 That is, the standard deviation
for economic damages is lower than for pain and suffering. The gap is
even greater if we adjust for the size of the mean award by expressing
the standard deviation as a percentage of the mean award.
TABLE III. VARIATION IN JUROR DAMAGE AWARDS
Median Mean SD SD as %
of Mean
Economic Damages3 ' (N=470) $335,250 $400,335 $550,738 138%
Pain & Suffering (N=470) $100,000 $278,214 $871,194 313%
Trimmed Economic Damages 32
(N=473) $336,000 $355,320 $266,544 75%
Trimmed Pain & Suffering
(N=473) $100,000 $223,807 $344,566 154%
Our attempt to trace the sources of this variation to individual dif-
ferences in the background and attitudes of jurors met with little suc-
cess. In contrast to the judgments on liability, the variability of juror
damage preferences showed no pattern associated with individual dif-
ferences. Whether the focus is on economic damages or on the more
28. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 912 (1979).
29. All of the award distributions are characterized by high variance and skew. To reduce the
impact of outliers, we also analyzed the data using trimmed scores, that is, by reducing the most
extreme 3% of scores to the level of the score at the 97th percentile.
30. The logged values showed the same pattern, with a standard deviation of 1.15 for eco-
nomic damages and a standard deviation of 4.06 for pain and suffering.
31. Three cases in which the jurors' total award exceeded more than four times the size of the
next larger award were removed from the analysis of the untrimmed awards because of the
extreme disproportionate effect they had on the means and standard deviations. Including them
simply inflated the means and standard deviations substantially, but did not affect the
relationships reflected in the table.
32. Trimmed values were created by treating values above the 97th percentile as if the juror
favored the award given by jurors at the 97th percentile.
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discretionary awards for pain and suffering, variation across jurors on
what the award should be was characterized by two qualities: it was
substantial and it could not be explained by the predictors included in
the study. As Table I indicates, in contrast to liability, neither back-
ground characteristics nor attitudes were systematically related to eco-
nomic or pain and suffering awards. 33 The single consistent predictor
of damage awards from this list of twenty-one individual differences
was the juror's own internal standard for compensating losses (LOSS).
One possible interpretation of these findings is that we have not yet
identified the systematic juror characteristics associated with damage
preferences-that some set of unmeasured attitudes and background
characteristics would improve our ability to explain the variation in
response among jurors who agreed that some compensatory award
was appropriate. A second possibility is that the unpredictability in
awards is largely the result of inherent random variation in making
these judgments, especially when jurors receive limited guidance and
are left to their own devices to provide the appropriate reference
points for their damage estimates.
In either case, the variability in juror responses suggests a substan-
tial potential for variability in jury awards based merely on the make-
up of the particular jury that decides a case.34 But before drawing that
conclusion, it is worth considering a more relevant set of data-the
data reflecting variation among jury verdicts. Jurors after all do not sit
as individual decision makers. At least six members pool their indi-
vidual preferences to arrive at a group verdict. That arrangement has
some impact on the variability in jury awards. We look first at a com-
parison of award variability for jurors who served on juries that found
in favor of the plaintiff and who awarded damages. The standard
deviation of total individual predeliberation awards for these jurors
was $7,188,976. For the jury verdicts from these same jurors, the stan-
dard deviation was $950,524-a fraction of the size.35
33. Table I shows the correlations with the trimmed damage awards. We also conducted the
same analyses substituting the logged values, again to adjust for the skewed distribution. The
same pattern of results was obtained for trimmed and logged damage awards.
34. These estimates may even be conservative if, for example, jurors who initially think that
the defendant should not be held liable tend to favor particularly low damage awards. We did
not ask jurors who favored a verdict for the defendant to speculate on what they would have
awarded if they had decided that the defendant should be held liable. But see infra note 35 for
an analysis that treats those awards as if they were $0.
35. If we include all deliberating jurors and juries, treating a verdict or verdict preference in
favor of the defendant as a zero award, the pattern remains the same: $38,159,881 for the stan-
dard deviation of the 700 individual jurors, $557,504 for the standard deviation of the 120 jury
verdicts.
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TABLE IV. COMPARING JUROR AND JURY DAMAGE AWARDS
Trimmed
Raw Juror Jury
Juror Awards Awards3 6  Awards
(97) (97) (24)
Economic Damages
Mean $1,919,637 $374,431 $412,491
Median $340,000 $343,000 $382,500
Standard Deviation $5,196,578 $312,802 $320,077
SD as % of Mean 271% 84% 78%
Pain and Suffering
Mean $2,301,969 $291,660 $486,097
Median $100,000 $100,000 $162,500
Standard Deviation $4,255,056 $521,359 $714,556
SD as % of Mean 185% 179% 147%
Table IV compares raw and trimmed juror awards with jury awards
for economic damages and for pain and suffering. The raw juror
awards, like the total individual predeliberation awards, show extreme
variability ($5,196,578 for economic damages and $4,255,056 for pain
and suffering awards). Expressed as a percentage of the mean award,
the variability for both economic damages and pain and suffering
awards is large (271% and 185%). Compared to the variability of the
raw juror awards, the variability of the jury awards was dramatically
reduced-jury awards for both economic damages and for pain and
suffering, although variable, were substantially more concentrated
around the mean jury awards (78% and 147%). The raw figures, of
course-both the means and the measures of variability-are strongly
inflated by a few extreme outliers. As a result, we examined the pat-
tern for the trimmed awards.
Before looking at measures of variability, it is important to note
that jury awards in this case were higher than the average mean and
median juror awards, a pattern found in several other studies of dam-
age awards.3 7 Thus, the mean trimmed award for economic damages
increased from $374,431 to $412,491 and the mean trimmed award for
pain and suffering nearly doubled from $291,660 to $486,097. The
higher mean awards for juries than for jurors permitted greater varia-
bility in jury awards. Thus, the variability did not drop in absolute
dollars for jury awards for both economic damages and damages for
36. The juror figures do not include the jurors who initially favored a verdict for the defendant
at the beginning of deliberations. The jury figures do reflect input from all of these jurors. Thus,
the variability of the juror awards may be higher than the numbers in the table suggest if jurors
inclined to vote against liability would favor extremely low (or high) awards.
37. See, e.g., Diamond & Casper, supra note 9, at 553.
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pain and suffering. As a percentage of mean award, however, jury
variability was lower than juror variability for both types of damage
awards, dropping from 84% to 78% for economic damages and from
179% to 147% for pain and suffering awards.
These results suggest some potential for deliberations and the pool-
ing of damage estimates on a six-member jury to reduce variability in
damage awards.38 Nonetheless, substantial unexplained variability re-
mained across juries, and that variability among juries was roughly
twice as high for pain and suffering damages as for economic damages.
Approaches to Reducing Undesirable Variability
The pattern of verdicts described here reveals considerable varia-
tion in both juror and jury awards. A substantial portion of that varia-
tion is not predictable from measures of either background or
attitudinal individual differences across jurors. To the extent that the
variation reflects genuine differences in perspectives on ambiguous
case attributes, the variation reflects a rational response to ambiguity,
but it leaves one troubling feature in its wake. The combined perspec-
tive of the particular set of jurors who happen to be selected for a case
will determine the outcome and that outcome might have been differ-
ent if a different sample of six had been selected. 39 The most direct
way to reduce this source of variation, that is, variation due to the
idiosyncratic composition of a particular jury, is to reduce the un-
representativeness of a particular sample by the simple un-reform re-
form of increasing the sample size and restoring the jury to its
traditional complement of twelve.
The six-member jury is a relatively modern invention. The common
law jury consisted of twelve members. Ironically, at the same time
that Congress moved to increase jury heterogeneity, 40 the U.S.
Supreme Court held that neither criminal nor civil juries consisting of
38. A similar result was obtained by Shari Diamond and Jonathan Casper in their study of
antitrust damage awards by 411 jurors assigned to one of 70 juries. The mean individual pre-
deliberation verdict preference for jurors was $213,270 and the mean jury award was $269,945.
The standard deviation dropped from $175,988 for jurors to $122,749 for juries. Expressed as a
percentage of the mean, the drop was from 82% to 45%. See Shari S. Diamond & Jonathan D.
Casper, Understanding Juries (forthcoming) (manuscript on file with authors).
39. It is of course interesting to consider what level of variation across similar cases is pro-
duced by variations in the verdict preferences of individual judges who, sitting alone, do not pool
their preferences at all.
40. The passage of the federal Jury Selection and Service Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-274,
§ 101, 82 Stat. 53 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. §§ 1863-1878 (1988)) required that voters'
lists be used as the primary source for selecting juror panels, expanding the representativeness of
jury panels. In Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522 (1975), the Court overturned Louisiana's af-
firmative registration plan for juror selection which required that women (but not men) who
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as few as six members violated constitutional requirements. 41 Thus,
juries became both more heterogeneous and smaller, increasing the
likelihood that an atypical group of six would be entrusted with decid-
ing on a verdict. By pooling contributions from twelve rather than six
sources, the larger jury would be likely to arrive at a more reliable
estimate of an appropriate damage award. 42 Whether the jury is as-
sessing economic or general damages, the effect of pooling should be
to reduce the influence of idiosyncratic estimates.
Nonetheless, although Table IV provides direct evidence that varia-
bility in damage awards dropped as we moved from juror to jury, vari-
ability in pain and suffering awards remained high at the jury level, at
least in our relatively small sample of cases in which the juries
awarded damages. One explanation for the continued high variability
of the jury pain and suffering award is that the absence of any guide-
posts comparable to the expert testimony offered for economic dam-
ages may discourage jurors from effectively pooling their estimates.
Efforts to reduce variability across juries for pain and suffering awards
may require an additional and more radical approach: providing the
jury with a set of reference points against which to assess potential
damage awards. There is strong evidence that jurors would be eager
to use such information.
Under current practice, the only reference point jurors receive re-
garding pain and suffering is an ad damnum, the amount requested by
the plaintiff. A majority of states permit attorneys to present the jury
with this suggested figure for pain and suffering, although several
states prohibit a specific request.43 The ad damnum may or may not
reasonably reflect the amount of pain and suffering experienced by
the plaintiff, since the plaintiff's attorney need not offer any specific
evidence or justification to support the amount requested. Yet there
is evidence that damage awards are influenced by the amount re-
quested. In the study described in this article we had one additional
experimental manipulation on the ad damnum amount the plaintiff
mentioned for pain and suffering. One-fourth of the jurors heard the
plaintiff request $250,000 for pain and suffering, while the remaining
jurors were not given a specific damage request for pain and suffering.
Mentioning a specific figure had a substantial effect on awards:
were willing to serve as jurors had to go to the courthouse to formally register in order to be
eligible to serve. Id. at 538.
41. Colgrove v. Battin, 413 U.S. 149 (1973); Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78 (1970).
42. Michael J. Saks, The Smaller the Jury, the Greater the Unpredictability, 79 JUDICATURE
263, 263-64 (1996); Hans Zeisel & Shari Seidman Diamond, "Convincing Empirical Evidence"
on the Six Member Jury, 41 U. CH. L. REV. 281, 290 (1974).
43. See, e.g., Botta v. Brunner, 138 A.2d 713, 725 (N.J. 1958).
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although the median award was $100,000 for both jurors who did and
jurors who did not hear an ad damnum from the plaintiff, the average
award was significantly lower for jurors who heard the ad damnum
than for jurors left to arrive at an amount totally on their own. More-
over, although 5% of the jurors who heard no ad damnum gave
awards over $1,000,000, that figure was the maximum award for pain
and suffering by jurors who heard the $250,000 ad damnum. Even
when we trimmed the pain and suffering awards-treating those over
one million as if they were a million-the average award without the
ad damnum ($225,674) was significantly greater than with the ad
damnum ($149,345) (t471=3.24, p<.001). The suggested amount thus
acted as an anchor on juror awards for pain and suffering, even
though it was not supported by any specific evidence or justification.
A similar result was obtained by James Zuehl in a study in which
thirty-nine simulated juries reacting to the same personal injury case
were given an ad damnum of $10,000, $75,000, or $150,000, or asked
to give "substantial compensation."' 44 The average jury awards in the
three exact-request conditions were $18,000, $62,800, and $101,400.
Other researchers studying the effect of ad damnums on individual
judgments have obtained similar effects. 45 The fact that these arbitrary
amounts influence decisions on awards reflects a more general phe-
nomenon of anchoring and adjustment that occurs when individuals
are called upon to make numerical estimates in a judgment task.
Whether that task involves answering a factual question 46 or expres-
sing a personal preference 47 or evaluating an appropriate price for a
house, individuals are influenced in their estimates by suggested
figures. The influence occurs even when those figures are obviously
arbitrary, obvious even to the individual doing the judging. Moreover,
experts as well as novices are influenced by anchors. 48
44. Greene, supra note 24, at 232 (discussing James Zuehl, The Ad Damnum, Jury Instruc-
tions, and Personal Injury Damage Awards (Aug. 1, 1982) (unpublished manuscript)).
45. Gretchen B. Chapman & Brian H. Bornstein, The More You Ask for the More You Get:
Anchoring in Personal Injury Verdicts, 10 APPLIED COGNITIVE PSYCHOL. 519 (1996); Verlin B.
Hinsz & Kristin E. Indahl, Assimilation to Anchors for Damage Awards in a Mock Civil Trial, 25
J. APPLIED Soc. PSYCHOL. 991 (1995); John Malouff & Nicola S. Schutte, Shaping Juror Atti-
tudes: Effects of Requesting Different Damage Amounts in Personal Injury Trials, 129 J. Soc.
PSYCHOL. 491 (1989).
46. DANIEL KAHNEMAN & AMOS TVERSKY, JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY (1974).
47. Gretchen B. Chapman & Eric J. Johnson, The Limits of Anchoring, 7 J. BEHAV. DECISION
MAKING 223 (1994).
48. See, e.g., Gregory B. Northcraft & Margaret A. Neale, Experts, Amateurs, and Real Estate:
An Anchoring-and-Adjustment Perspective on Property Pricing Decisions, 39 ORG. BEHAV. &
HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 84 (1987).
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But, of course, the figures that jurors are given need not be arbi-
trary to be influential. Michael Saks and his colleagues have shown
some evidence that variability in pain and suffering awards can be
substantially reduced when mock jurors are provided with the distri-
bution of awards in comparable cases.49 The proposal to provide such
guidance requires the selection of an appropriate set of comparable
cases in order to create a relevant distribution. This task is similar to
the one faced by the early drafters of federal sentencing guidelines. 50
Responding to evidence of what was perceived to be unwarranted dis-
parity in criminal sentencing-similar offenses and offenders receiving
differing sentences-the drafters began by summarizing past practice
and attempting to identify regularities in past practice.51 Ultimately,
judges were provided with a range of appropriate sentences, based in
part on average actual past sentences for similar cases. An important
characteristic of sentencing that made the selection of typical past
practice an acceptable approach was the acknowledged absence of a
clear consensus or other indicator that could identify how severe a
sentence ought to be, even among judges or scholars who could agree
on the sentencing goal (i.e., who agreed that the goal was deterrence
or who agreed that the goal was "just deserts").52 Even without
agreement on a particular sentencing goal, use of mean past perform-
ance as a standard could theoretically reduce disparity.
Awards for pain and suffering display evidence of a similar unwar-
ranted disparity, suggesting that presumptive guidelines based on typi-
cal or past awards in response to comparable injuries would be one
way to reduce that disparity. 53 Even if we are willing to assume, how-
ever, that mean (or median) past practice in a set of comparable cases
is an appropriate standard-or at least a piece of information that a
jury might find useful-it is not at all clear how to identify that set of
comparable cases. For example, should it include all awards in cases
in which the injury involved a broken right arm? All awards in cases
in which the injury involved a broken right arm and the victim was
over sixty-five? All awards in cases in which the injury involved a
broken right arm and the victim was right handed? Should the pain
49. Michael J. Saks et al., Reducing Variability in Civil Jury Awards, 21 LAw & HUM. BEHAV.
243 (1997).
50. Stephen Breyer, The Federal Sentencing Guidelines and the Key Compromises Upon
Which They Rest, 17 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1 (1988).
51. Id. at 4, 7, 17.
52. Id. at 17.
53. For a similar approach to reducing unwarranted variability in punitive damage awards, see
Cass R. Sunstein et al., Assessing Punitive Damages (With Notes on Cognition and Valuation in
Law), 107 YALE L.J. 2071, 2114-20 (1998).
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and suffering award in a malpractice case that created the need for an
additional operation and an additional two week hospitalization in-
clude among comparable cases any case that involved the pain and
suffering associated with an additional operation or only cases in
which the hospital stay following the surgery lasted at least a week?
At least two weeks? No more than two weeks? The possibilities
swiftly multiply.
Guidance on pain and suffering awards need not go so far. A re-
form less intrusive to the adversary system would permit attorneys to
present to the jury a set of pain and suffering awards that juries had
made in cases that the attorneys (or their experts) put forward as com-
parable cases. This use of "comparables" is a standard part of prop-
erty tax appeals. In these appeals, attorneys present tax information
on a set of properties deemed to be comparable to the property whose
tax is at issue in order to provide a reference set for the trier of fact in
determining what tax level is appropriate.5 4 A similar approach is
used in condemnation proceedings.55 In both cases there is extensive
reliance on expert testimony to defend or challenge comparability. 56
The availability of public tax records and records of property sales
transactions makes it possible to identify comparable properties with-
out incurring substantial search costs. Jury verdict reporters have cre-
ated an analogous data bank of potentially comparable injuries, case
descriptions, and the jury awards that resulted from those cases.57
Although some additional costs would be imposed in testing the ade-
quacy of the nominated comparables, the search costs would be rela-
tively low for identifying candidates.
Selection of appropriate comparables need not be left entirely up to
the adversaries. The judge might, for example, retain discretionary
power to exclude an idiosyncratic prior verdict upon a showing that
the award was substantially inconsistent with the majority of awards in
54. Called the sales comparison approach, an estimate of the property's fair market value is
based on a comparison of the property in question to similar properties that have recently been
sold or are currently for sale. See Alex E. Sadler, The Inherent Ambiguity of Commercial Real
Estate Values, 13 VA. TAX REV. 787, 802 (1994).
55. See Michael Rikon, The Use of Prior Appraisals in Condemnation and Tax Certiorari
Cases, 70 N.Y. ST. B.J. 42 (1998).
56. In both cases, critics have pointed out that, although widely used, the method offers only
an imperfect reflection of actual fair market value unless there is an active, relatively homogene-
ous market from which trustworthy data can be derived. See Leslie Kent Beckhart, No Intrinsic
Value: The Failure of Traditional Real Estate Appraisal Methods to Value Income-Producing
Property, 66 S. CAL. L. REV. 2251, 2268 (1993).
57. Jury verdict reporters vary in quality and coverage, so that they may only imperfectly
reflect the complete distribution of jury verdicts. Nonetheless, they provide a rich source of the
range of jury verdicts from which to select examples.
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similar cases. This exercise of drawing comparisons is not entirely for-
eign to appellate courts that regularly consider whether a jury verdict
"shocks the conscience," but it is a proposal that calls for a somewhat
less extreme standard and closer surveillance. Here too some prece-
dent exists. In 1986 New York created a statutory standard allowing
trial courts to find a jury damage award "excessive or inadequate if it
deviates materially from what would be reasonable compensation. '58
Last year, in Geressy v. Digital Equipment Corp.,59 Judge Weinstein
accepted this invitation to compare in his assessment of a jury verdict
for pain and suffering: he evaluated the awards given by the jury by
comparing them to a list of comparable injuries in cases presented by
the parties.60 This exercise by the judge informed his decision. Such
comparisons regularly inform attorneys engaged in settlement discus-
sions. The question is, why not give the parties (and the jurors) the
opportunity for an informed jury?
58. N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5501(c) (McKinney 1986).
59. 980 F. Supp. 640 (E.D.N.Y 1997).
60. Id. at 657-60.
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APPENDIX
POTENTIAL PREDICTORS OF JUROR VERDICTS
Juror Background Characteristics
Age (in years)
Mean=41.2, SD=13.0
Gender
(1=Male (48.1%), 0=Female (51.9%))
Race
(1=White (68.4%), O=Minority (24.6% black, 4.5% hispanic, 2.0% Asian-American and
Native American)) (.5% other)
Politics
(1=very liberal, 7=very conservative) Mean=3.84, SD=1.32
Education (1=High school or less (23.8%),
2=Some college (36.8%),
3=College grad (39.4%))
Income (total annual family income logged)
Median income=$40,000
Prior service as a juror?
(1=Yes (19.9%), 0=No (80.1%))
Prior experience as a witness?
(1=Yes (9.9%), O=No (90.1%))
Prior experience as a party in a lawsuit?
(1=Yes (19.8%), O=No (80.2%))
Last smoked (1=Less than six months ago (28.8%),
2=6 months to 3 years ago (5.3%),
3=Between 3 and 5 years ago (2.0%),
4=More than 5 years ago (18.1%),
5=Never (45.8%))
Attitudinal Items and Scales
Toward Lawsuits:
TOO MUCH: When plaintiffs sue in a lawsuit and receive money damages, (on a scale from 1 to
7) would you say that in general they receive:
1=Too much, 7=Too little. Mean=3.67, SD=1.36
LEGITIMACY: 2 item scale reflecting legitimacy of lawsuits:
1=Legitimate, 7=Lacking legitimacy. Mean=4.84, SD=1.10
Consists of 2 items:
(1) There are far too many frivolous lawsuits today. 1=Agree strongly, 7=Disagree
strongly (this item is reverse scored)
(2) Most people who sue others in court have legitimate grievances. 1=Agree strongly,
7=Disagree strongly
EASY TO WIN: In general, how easy or difficult would you say it is for a plaintiff (that is, the
person who is suing) to win a civil lawsuit?
1=Very easy, 7=Very difficult. Mean=4.21, SD=1.13
Toward Business/Regulation:
BUSINESS: 3 item scale reflecting valence toward business:
1=Positive toward business, 7=Negative toward business (Cronbach's alpha=.60).
Mean=4.71, SD=1.14
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Consists of 3 items:
(1) Businesses care about the best interests of the public. 1=Agree strongly, 7=Disagree
strongly
(2) Big business in this country is concerned with the safety of its workers. l=Agree
strongly, 7=Disagree strongly
(3) American business and industry have lost sight of human values in the pursuit of profits.
1=Agree strongly, 7=Disagree strongly (this item is reverse scored)
INTERFERE: scale reflecting interference with business by government:
1=Government interferes, 7=Government does not interfere (Cronbach's alpha=.71).
Mean=3.77, SD=1.15
Consists of 4 items:
(1) The courts have meddled so much in the workplace that many businesses are not able to
remain competitive. 1=Agree strongly, 7=Disagree strongly
(2) The threat of being sued makes businesses less likely to develop new products.
1=Agree strongly, 7=Disagree strongly
(3) The threat of lawsuits is so common today that it interferes with the development of
new and useful products. 1=Agree strongly, 7=Disagree strongly
(4) The government has gone too far in regulating business and interfering with the free
enterprise system. 1=Agree strongly, 7=Disagree strongly
PUBLIC SAFETY: need to regulate product safety?
l=Need to reg, 7=No need. Mean=2.30, SD=1.24
Consists of 2 items:
(1) Ensuring the safety of products sold to the public is so important that regulations and
standards must require that products cause no risk of injury. 1=Agree strongly, 7=Disagree
strongly
(2) A company should be required to tell the public about any possibility, however small,
that its products might be unsafe. 1=Agree strongly, 7=Disagree strongly
Toward Experts:
EXPERTISE: Most experts witnesses in court cases are highly competent:
1=Agree strongly, 7=Disagree strongly, Mean=3.53, SD=1.38
TRUSTWORTHINESS: scale reflecting trustworthiness of expert testimony:
1=Cannot trust, 7=Can trust (Cronbach's alpha=.66). Mean=2.56, SD=1.13
Consists of 3 items:
(1) Most expert witnesses in court cases will give testimony that favors the side that paid
them to come to court. 1=Agree strongly, 7=Disagree strongly
(2) Lawyers can always find an expert who will back up their client's point of view, no
matter what it is. 1=Agree strongly, 7=Disagree strongly
(3) There is a lot of disagreement among experts in most professions. 1=Agree strongly,
7=Disagree strongly
Toward Smokers:
BLAME: People who smoke have no one to blame but themselves for any health problems they
develop due to cigarette smoking:
1=Agree strongly, 7=Disagree strongly. Mean=2.61, SD=1.65
Personal Financial Guideposts
WEALTH (TRIMMED TO THE 97TH PERCENTILE)-how much a person would have to
earn in a year to be considered "wealthy"
Mean=$327,668, Median=$200,000
1998] JUROR JUDGMENTS 325
LOSS (TRIMMED TO THE 97TH PERCENTILE)-mean of minimum and maximum award
the juror would require to compensate for 4 different injuries suffered in a car accident: loss of
sight, loss of arm the person uses to write, loss of bowel control, and facial scarring.
6 1
Mean=$2,022,276, Median=$765,625
Case Characteristics
STRENGTH: case weak or moderate on liability evidence
O=Weak: defendant a heavy smoker who never quit, testimony suggested weak exposure to
the defendant's product
1=Moderate: defendant a light smoker who quit at the time of his first health problem,
testimony suggested moderate exposure to the defendant's product
FORMAT: Unitary or Bifurcated Trial
O=Unitary: punitive damages evidence presented in the same trial with compensatory liabil-
ity and damage evidence
1=Bifurcated: punitive damages evidence presented in a separate consecutive trial before
the same jury, but only if the jury found the defendant liable for compensatory damages
61. Jurors were also asked about the minimum and maximum amounts necessary to compen-
sate an injured plaintiff for the loss of two front teeth, but those figures were not included in the
measure because juror responses to that injury did not correlate with responses to the other
types of injuries.
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